It was Yom Kippur Eve. The shul began filling rapidly as the time approached for Kol Nidrei. Hershel Machlis sat in his seat, cloaked in his tallis (prayer shawl) and kittel, quietly reciting Tefillah Zakkah, a prayer composed by the Chayei Adam 150 years ago.

This emotional prayer ushers in the Holy Day with an admission of our spiritual inadequacies and a supplication that the afflictions and prayers of the day should atone for our sins. It also includes a declaration of forgiveness and forgoing bygones to those who have wronged us, and a request that others may forgive us, as well.

“I forgive completely anyone who sinned against me, whether physically, monetarily, or verbally … except for money that I [intend to and] can collect in beis din … Everyone else I forgive completely… so that no one should be punished on my account. Just as I forgive every person, so too, grant me favor in the eyes of other people that they should forgive me fully.”

Mr. Machlis paused to think about Mr. Schor. Earlier in the year, Mr. Schor had borrowed money from him to marry off a child. As the months wore on, it became clear that the money would not be returned quickly. Mr. Machlis had decided in his mind to forgo the loan as an additional “wedding gift,” but had never said anything to Mr. Schor.

Recently, though, the two had gotten into a dispute. Mr. Machlis changed his mind and decided that he no longer was willing to forgo the debt. He didn’t want Mr. Schor to be punished on Yom Kippur, but he did want the money back.

“What about a loan that I previously intended to forgo?” wondered Mr. Machlis. “Can I still collect that?”

He decided to speak with Rabbi Dayan after davening.

“Tefillah Zakkah made me think about a loan that I had decided to forego, but changed my mind,” Mr. Machlis said. “Am I still allowed to demand repayment?”

“The primary intent of Tefillah Zakkah is to exempt the debtor from Heavenly punishment,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “Although it uses the term ‘mechilah gemurah’ (forgoing completely), it likely does not express intent to forgo legal rights. Nonetheless, the issue you raised is a fascinating one, known in halachah as ‘mechilah balev’, forgoing in one’s mind.’”

“Oh really?” exclaimed Mr. Machlis. “Who addresses this issue?”

“The Ketzos Hachoshen (12:1) cites a statement of the Maharshal that a person who decided to forgo his loan and now wants to take revenge and collect it, may no longer do so,” replied Rabbi Dayan, “since mechilah in the mind is considered mechilah.”

“The proof is from a gemara (Kesubos 104a) that a widow who did not claim her kesubah for 25 years can no longer do so,” explained Rabbi Dayan. “One explanation is that in the context of kesubah, her extended silence indicates intention to forgo the kesubah. Although she never said anything, her intention to forgo is valid.”

“Does the Ketzos accept this view?” asked Mr. Machlis.

“The Ketzos is troubled by the principle of ‘devarim shebalev einam devarim,’” said Rabbi Dayan. “Thoughts alone are not of legal consequence, with the exception of sacred donations.

“The Ketzos, citing the Maharit, differentiates that when the intention is clearly evident to all, as in the case of the widow, we attribute significance to thoughts. However, when the intention is not clearly evident, as in the average case of mechilah balev, it is not of significance.”

“What is the accepted ruling?” asked Mr. Machlis.

“Most authorities agree with the Ketzos,” said Rabbi Dayan. “There are some, though, who concur with the Maharshal.” (See Nesivos 12:5; Aruch Hashulchan 12:8; Yabia Omer C.M. 3:3.)

“So what do I do?” asked Mr. Machlis.

“You are certainly entitled to demand your money, in accordance with the majority opinion,” said Rabbi Dayan. “If it were to become known to the beis din, though, that you initially decided in your mind to forgo the loan, they would likely not enforce payment, in deference to the minority opinion and the principle of hamotzi mei’chaveiro alav hare’aya.”

We were traveling back from the Siyum HaShas. Full of excitement, a friend and I danced in the aisles. The bus made a sudden short stop and I fell on another friend’s hat, ruining it.

Q: Am I responsible to pay for the hat?

A: Generally, regarding adam hamazik (damage caused by a person), the rule is that he is liable, even for damage due to oness - unpredictable circumstances (C.M. 378:1). However, even when circumstances were completely beyond his control, it is debated whether he is liable (C.M. 378:2). Although a short stop might not be predictable, everyone is aware of the possibility, so he could have been more cautious. This is grounds for liability.

Nevertheless, Halachah differentiates between dancing and standing in the aisles. The Gemara (B.K. 48b) discusses liability for people who bump into one another in the street. The governing principle is the determination whether both parties are acting with equal rights or not. When both acted either with permission (reshus) or without permission (shelo b’reshus) and they “damage one another” they are liable. If they do not act with equal rights, the one acting without permission is liable. The definition of “damage one another” is subject to debate. Some explain that it refers to causing damage, and intent is not a factor (Rashi); therefore, the damager is liable for accidental damage.

Although standing in the aisles is a permissible behavior, that permission is not an exemption from liability, even though there was no intent to damage. According to other opinions, intent to damage is the critical factor, and one who damages accidentally is exempt from liability (Rambam). Since a standing passenger did not have intent to damage, he is exempt (see C.M. 378:4,7; 421:8).

In fact, it is reasonable to argue that the damager is exempt even according to the first opinion. Since it is commonly understood and legally accepted that people may have to stand in the aisles, it is implicit that a person falling due to a short stop will not be liable (see Rema 378:9).

The rules are different when one behaves without permission, i.e. in an abnormal manner. The Chazon Ish (B.K. 4:2) explains that a subset of the definition of “permission” is behaving in a normal manner. Therefore, one who unintentionally causes damage while behaving in an abnormal manner is liable - even though he has permission to be there. Accordingly, a porter who stops short without cause is liable, even though he has permission to be there transporting merchandise (C.M. 379:2). Not warning others [of an impending short stop] is considered as though he acted without permission (see also 378:8).

Accordingly, since dancing in the aisles is abnormal behavior, he is behaving without permission and liable if he falls and causes damage.

Q: A blind neighbor has a seeing-eye dog. He went away for a week and asked me to look after his dog. If the dog damages, who is responsible for the damage?

A: A person who takes responsibility for an entrusted item also takes responsibility that it should not damage, unless stipulated otherwise. Therefore, if you were negligent in watching the animal and it caused damage, you are responsible for the damage (C.M. 396:8). Conversely, if the animal damaged your own property, the owner is not liable (347:1).

If you watched the animal properly, but it caused damage nonetheless, neither you nor the owner is liable. [If the guardian watched the animal minimally, a shomer chinam (unpaid guardian) is not liable, but the owner remains liable for certain kinds of damage (keren tam); whereas a shomer sachar (paid guardian) or sho’el (borrower) is liable (see Sma 396:18; Gra 396:18).]

However, if the animal was entrusted to a minor, the owner remains liable for damage done by the animal (396:6). Similarly, if the animal has a history of damaging, but the owner did not disclose this to the guardian, the owner remains liable (Pischei Choshen, Pikadon, 2:[70]).