“Tonight is Bernie’s birthday,” Jeremy said to his friend, Adam. “We’re planning a surprise party for him. Would you like to join?”

“Sure!” said Adam. “What can I bring?”

“Chocolate chip cookies would be great,” said Jeremy.

Since it was shortly after Pesach, Adam bought the cookies at a corner grocery whose owner did not seem to be Jewish. He brought the cookies with him to the birthday party.

“Where did you buy the cookies?” asked Jeremy.

“At the grocery on the corner,” said Adam.

“Sorry, but I was told by a reliable kashrus authority that the store is owned by a Jew,” said Jeremy. “He did not sell his chametz, so the cookies are prohibited!”

Jeremy took the pack of cookies, tore it open, and dumped the contents into the garbage.

Adam stared at him. “Why did you do that?” he asked angrily.

“What do you mean?” said Jeremy. “The cookies are chametz she’avar alav haPesach and completely prohibited. What is there to do with them?”

“I could have returned them to the store and gotten my money back,” said Adam.

“The cookies have no monetary value,” replied Jeremy. “The sale was a non-sale, and he owes you the money anyway.”

“But he won’t refund the money if I don’t return the cookies,” argued Adam. “You’ve made me lose the money, and you owe me what I paid for them.”

“How could I have to pay for something that has no monetary value?” asked Jeremy.

“Whether it has value or not, I need the package of cookies to get my money refunded,” replied Adam. “Bottom line, you’ve caused me a loss!”

After the party, the two went to Rabbi Dayan and asked: “Is Jeremy liable for the cookies?”

“This case is known in halacha as davar hagorem l’mamon — something that has monetary ramifications but no inherent monetary value,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “Jeremy is not liable for the cookies according to most authorities.”

“I don’t think I’ve ever heard of that term,” said Adam. “Can you elaborate?”

“The Gemara (B.K. 98b) discusses the case of a person who stole chametz before Pesach and held it for the duration of Pesach,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “The chametz is now prohibited as chametz she’avar alav haPesach and monetarily worthless. Nonetheless, if the thief returns the stolen chametz intact, he is exempt from additional payment (C.M. 363:1).”

“Wow, that’s surprising!” said Adam.

“Now, suppose that you destroyed the chametz after Pesach before the thief had a chance to return it,” continued Rabbi Dayan. “The chametz has no intrinsic monetary value, but has ramifications for the thief. If he returns the chametz, he is exempt; if not, he will have to pay what the chametz was worth when he stole it. Do you have to pay the thief for the damage that you caused him?”

“Good question,” said Jeremy.

“This is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the other Sages,” explained Rabbi Dayan. “Rabbi Shimon maintains that since the chametz has monetary ramifications for the thief, it is considered something of value to him, so you have to pay. The Sages maintain, however, that since the chametz that you destroyed has no inherent monetary value, you are not liable.”

“This seems parallel to our case,” noted Adam.

“Correct. The package of cookies has no intrinsic value, but has ramifications for Adam to get a refund,” said Rabbi Dayan. “We rule like the Sages, so Jeremy is not liable. The Shach (C.M. 386:1, 11) cites the opinion of the Ramban, that even according to the Sages there is an obligation of garmi, but sides against this opinion. Furthermore, the store owner owes you the refund even if you do not return the cookies, since he sold you a worthless item. Thus, Jeremy does not have to pay for the cookies, even if the store owner refuses to give a refund without the return of the cookies.” (See Pischei Choshen, Nezikin, 3:[57]; 10:20 regarding grama.)

I found a cell phone in the street. As I was examining it, a woman approached me and identified herself as the owner of the phone, so I gave it to her without any further questions.

A few minutes later, a young man asked me if I had seen his phone and gave some identifying details. I realized that I had given his phone to the woman.

Q. Am I responsible for his phone, since I gave it to the wrong person?

A: One who finds a lost object becomes a custodian for that object and must safeguard the object until it is returned to the owner. However, there is a dispute concerning the degree of responsibility the finder has toward the lost object. Some authorities maintain that since the finder may not take payment for returning the lost object, he is categorized as an unpaid custodian (shomer chinam) who is liable only if he was negligent. According to others, he is categorized as a paid custodian who is liable if the object is lost or stolen. While he is attending to the lost object, he is exempt from having to give money to a poor person, which is considered a benefit for guarding the lost object.

Although this debate is not definitively resolved, all opinions agree that if the lost object is negligently returned to an unprotected place, the finder remains liable for the object’s well-being (C.M. 267: 1, 16).

Accordingly, once you picked up the phone, you became a custodian for it. It would seem that since you negligently gave it to the woman without confirming that it was hers, you must reimburse the owner for his used phone.

However, your liability is not such a simple matter. If the owner produced witness testimony that the phone was his, you would be liable for your negligence. However, there is a dispute whether a finder is liable if the alleged owner only provides identifying marks. One approach is that we do not force the finder to pay for the lost object if the claimant’s only evidence that the phone belonged to him are the identifying marks that he described (simanim). Possibly, when the identifying marks are unquestionably clear (siman muvhak), the finder could be forced to pay for the lost or stolen object (Ketzos 259:2, 297:1 and Nesivos ibid. and 46:8).

Accordingly, the finder cannot be forced to pay if the owner merely provides identifying marks that the phone is his (see Shitah Mikubetzes, B.M. 25b in the name of Ramach and Nefesh Chaya B.M. 28a). Others contend that the finder is liable when the owner can provide identifying marks (Mishpat HaAveidah 259 b”h 5).

In your case, since it seems to you that the person who identified himself as the owner is honest and provided identifying marks supporting his claim, according to all opinions, you should reimburse him for the value of the phone.

Q: One horse kicked another horse, injuring it. Is the first horse’s owner liable?

A: Vicious damage done by an animal not for its pleasure is called keren (horn), such as goring, pushing, biting, squashing, and kicking. Such behavior is considered unusual. The Torah limits payment to only one-half the value of the damage, and is payable only in the form of the damaging animal itself, up to its worth (C.M. 389:2, 5-6, 19). This payment is considered a knas (fine). Therefore, beis din is not authorized to adjudicate cases of keren nowadays, but the victim can grab the amount owed (C.M. 1:1, 5). There is a dispute whether the owner has a Heavenly obligation (chiyuv latzeis yedei Shamayim) to pay (Pischei Choshen, Nezikin 5:[18]).

Keren includes all types of unusual damage, e.g. eating food not normally eaten or jumping on something in an atypical fashion; this is not considered shen or regel (390:12; 391:2).

If the action is repeated three consecutive times, the animal gains the status of “muad” (cautioned) and full out-of-pocket payment is required. Nowadays, since beis din is not authorized to adjudicate, an animal cannot be made muad, but we require the owner to get rid of the animal (Aruch Hashulchan 389:12).