Yidsville had a small but dedicated Jewish community. There was one Orthodox synagogue, led by Rabbi Well. The shul was small and in disrepair, in desperate need of renovation. In addition to a number of significant donations, the shul committee and Rabbi Well decided to levy a $3,000 building tax on each member family.

A letter was sent out to the community explaining the need to renovate the shul and the decision to levy a building tax.

A few days later, Rabbi Well received a letter from one member, Mr. Elman:

Dear Rabbi Well,

I applaud your efforts in renovating the shul; it is truly in need of repair. I contributed generously to the maintenance of the shul throughout the years. Two years ago, I suffered a severe stroke and do not attend shul, other than on the Yamim Nora’im. Therefore, I don’t feel that I should have to pay the building tax for the renovations. I am happy to enclose a $1,000 donation toward the cause, but feel that the $3,000 is excessive.

Respectfully,

Mr. Elman

Rabbi Well called Mr. Elman to discuss the issue with him. “I empathize with your feelings, but the $3,000 tax is being levied on all members of the shul,” explained Rabbi Well. “We did not differentiate between those who use the shul on a daily basis and those who use it only on Shabbos, or even those who rarely attend.”

“Why is that?” asked Mr. Elman.

“This is a community project,” replied Rabbi Well. “You are part of the Jewish community of Yidsville. As such, we expect you to participate fully in the shul renovations.”

“This doesn’t seem fair to me!” exclaimed Mr. Elman.

“Perhaps you would like pose the question to Rabbi Dayan?” asked Rabbi Well. “Would that make you feel more comfortable?”

Rabbi Well and Mr. Elman met with Rabbi Dayan and asked: “Does Mr. Elman have to participate fully with the community in the shul renovation fund?”

“A similar question was addressed 550 years ago to the Mahari Mintz (responsa #7), asking whether elderly people have to participate in building a mikveh,” answered Rabbi Dayan. “He ruled that every community member can be required to participate in something that is a communal need, even if the individual does not have a regular need for it (Rema, C.M. 163:3).”

“What is the basis for this?” asked Mr. Elman.

“The Mishnah (B.B. 7b) teaches that all members of a joint courtyard have to participate in expenditures needed for the proper functioning of the courtyard,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “Similarly, all townspeople have to participate in expenditures needed for the proper functioning of the city. This is because the townspeople are considered partners in the town’s endeavors.”

“But since I can’t make it to shul,” argued Mr. Elman, “I’m not a partner in this endeavor!”

“Maahari Mintz gives two explanations for his ruling,” explained Rabbi Dayan. “First, something that is an essential part of a Jewish community is, by definition, relevant to anyone who is a part of the Jewish community.

“Second, there are certain times, such as the Yamim Nora’im, when it is relevant for everyone.”

“It seems, then, that whether someone who doesn’t use the shul has to pay depends on the two reasons of the Mahari Mintz,” Mr. Elman pointed out. “According to the first reason, he has to pay. According to the second reason, though, he shouldn’t have to pay, since he doesn’t have the need.”

“The Sma (163:32) accepts the first rationale as the primary reason,” responded Rabbi Dayan. “Accordingly, even someone who has no need at all must participate in the shul fund. Furthermore, although the Chasam Sofer (O.C. #193) requires some need, as Mahari Mintz’s second reason, you have the option of using the shul any time and you do have an occasional need, on the Yamim Nora’im. Thus, you must pay the $3,000.”

My brother, Shimon, and I did not immediately divide our late father’s assets. Shimon’s daughter became engaged and he took our father’s esrog box and gifted it to his future son-in-law. I was aware of this and did not say anything at the time. Now that we are in the process of dividing our father’s assets, I maintain that the value of the esrog box should be deducted from his share, but he says that since I knew he was giving it away, I was mochel, and we should split the assets evenly.

Q: Is the esrog box still considered part of our inheritance?

A: When brothers inherit their father’s estate, they become partners and can prevent one from taking from the estate unless it will be deducted from his share of the final division. If Reuven does not protest when Shimon takes clothing from the estate, and the clothing remains intact when the final division occurs, the value of those garments is deducted from Shimon’s share. If the clothing wore out or got lost, its value is not deducted.

Chazal surmise that in such a circumstance, Reuven’s silence means that he forgoes (is mochel) his share in those garments in favor of his brother. In the event that Shimon takes clothing for his family members, the halacha depends on whether he took weekday or Shabbos clothing. The value of Shabbos clothing is deducted, but the value of weekday clothing is not deducted. The distinction is that there is no expectation that someone’s wife or children will appear before beis din for the garments they are wearing to be appraised. Therefore, it is assumed that Reuven’s silence is a mechila of his claim to those garments. Shabbos clothes can be sent to beis din for appraisal, so Reuven is not mochel his share in their value (C.M. 176:9).

Based on these principles, Rema rules (287:1) that if one brother takes something from the estate and gives it away and his brothers don’t protest, their silence is interpreted as mechila. Others disagree and contend that it is only in a relationship between siblings that their children’s appearance before beis din to appraise their Shabbos clothing is not humiliating; the other siblings’ silence is interpreted as mechila. But when a brother gives a gift to someone else, there is no reason to believe that the other brothers are mochel. Those items would be deducted from the portion of that brother who gave them away (Bach 288:2, Knesses Hagedolah there). Seemingly, your situation with your father’s esrog box is subject to this dispute.

In truth, in your case, all opinions agree that the value of the esrog box must be deducted from Shimon’s portion. Rema’s distinction between weekday and Shabbos clothes related to whether the garments could be brought to beis din for appraisal or not. Rema derives that when a gift is given to a third party, it is assumed that the recipient will not present it for appraisal;  therefore, the others’ silence constitutes mechila. In your case, since Shimon gave the esrog box to his future son-in-law, who is part of the family, there is no reason to believe that it would not be able to be appraised by beis din, so your silence does not constitute mechila (see also Pischei Choshen Shutfim 2 [53]).

Q: A bird-lover set up feeding stations and resting places for birds in his yard. The neighbors complain that the flocks of birds dirty their adjacent properties, make excessive noise, and ruin their gardens. Do they have legal recourse?

A: Beyond the responsibility not to do actual damage, a person is responsible not to do things on his property that will adversely impact his neighbors’ property in a direct manner. This is known as nizkei shecheinim (see C.M. 155). This applies not only to monetary damage; our Sages also instituted various neighborly rights relating to privacy (hezek re’iyah), noise, smell, air, light and dampness.

Even if the person is willing to pay should damage occur, he is not allowed to create the potential damage. He may not be in a financial position to pay; the neighbor also does not want the hassle of repairing and litigating to recoup his loss (Sma 155:3). Even if the person already installed the damaging item, the neighbor can force him to remove it (Pischei Choshen, Nezikin 13:24).

Thus, if the birds dirty the neighborhood in a manner that is repulsive, the neighbors can force the person to remove his feeders (C.M. 155:39).