"Shavuos is here!” Rabbi Dayan announced to a group of tenth-grade students. “Someone has sponsored $50 gift certificates at the sefarim store for those who learn the entire night!”

The students looked at each other approvingly. Many planned to learn through the night anyway, but the incentive confirmed their plans.

“I have to point out,” added Rabbi Dayan, “that the stipulation is not just to stay awake, but to learn! It is written regarding Rosh Hashanah that one who sits idle is like one who is sleeping” (M.B. 583:9).

The students arranged to learn together as a group and keep each other awake through the night.

Dovid rested on Shabbos, and planned to learn much of the night with his chavrusa, Boaz. He managed to fight his tiredness till 3:30 a.m., but toward morning collapsed into sleep. Boaz tried unsuccessfully to rouse him.

“Too bad,” Boaz sighed. “I’ll continue on alone.”

Just then, somebody spilled a cup of hot tea on Boaz, and his arm got burned. A Hatzolah member rushed him to the bathroom to place the arm under cold water and then sent him home to pack it with ice.

After Shavuos the students came to get their gift certificates from Rabbi Dayan. “It seems that almost all of you had the privilege of learning all night,” he said proudly.

After everyone else left, Dovid and Boaz approached Rabbi Dayan. “We tried our best to learn all night, but uncontrollable circumstances (oness) prevented us,” David said. “I napped in the afternoon and valiantly tried to keep awake, but sleep overpowered me.”

“Someone spilled boiling tea on my arm and I had to go home,” added Boaz. “You taught us that ‘oness rachaman patrei — one is not liable for uncontrollable circumstances’ (B.K. 28b). Shouldn’t we be entitled to gift certificates?”

“You are not rightfully entitled to gift certificates,” answered Rabbi Dayan. “A claim of oness does not apply here.”

“Why not?” asked Dovid.

“First, the Shach (C.M. 55:1) qualifies that only a rare or unusual occurrence is grounds for claiming oness, but not a common one, which should have been addressed in the agreement,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “For example, in the Gemara’s times, a flooded river is considered oness, but not a broken bridge or ferry. Thus, falling asleep is not grounds for claiming oness, since it is common.”

“What about me?” asked Boaz. “Getting burned is certainly uncommon!”

“True, but there is a second, more fundamental reason,” said Rabbi Dayan. “Oness exempts from punishment, and generally does not obligate a person in a fine or penalty, because he is not held accountable for having violated the prohibition or stipulation. However, oness of one party cannot obligate the other side; it is still not considered as if the person fulfilled the stipulation.

“The Talmud Yerushalmi (Kiddushin 3:2) records a dispute about someone who betrothed a woman on condition that he marry her by a certain date, but was prevented from doing so due to oness,” explained Rabbi Dayan. “Rabi Yochanan maintains that oness is not considered as having fulfilled the stipulated action, so that the betrothal is void; Rabi Shimon ben Lakish (Reish Lakish) considers it as having been fulfilled. The halachah follows Rav Yochanan. Although the Torah exempts oness, it does not obligate the other party.

“Thus, had you made an agreement that if you don’t learn all night you will pay, oness could exempt you from paying,” added Rabbi Dayan. “However, regarding the agreement that if you learn all night the sponsor will reward you, since you did not learn all night — for whatever reason, even due to oness — he is not obligated to give the gift to you” (Shach, C.M. 21:3; Ketzos 21:1).

“I’ll ask if he’s willing to gift you for your efforts, though,” concluded Rabbi Dayan, “but that is at his discretion.”

I opened the windows, not noticing that my friend’s speakers were on the windowsill. The wind knocked over the speakers and they broke.

Q: Am I obligated to pay for the speakers?

A: This week we will address whether you are liable for damage caused directly by the wind. [Next week iy”H we will address a case where the wind blew on a curtain, which knocked down the speaker.]

The Gemara (Sanhedrin 77b) discusses one who removes a plug in a dam and consequently water rushed in and killed someone. The Gemara states that if the person died from the initial rush of water (koach rishon), the one who removed the plug is accountable. If it was the subsequent flow of water rather than the initial rush that killed the victim, the person who removed the plug is not subject to punishment in beis din since the murderous act is considered indirect (grama).

There is a disagreement whether the same principle applies when removing a plug damages property. According to some, the same principle applies, and if property is damaged from the initial rush of water, the one who removed the plug is liable. If the property was damaged from the subsequent flow of water, the damage is indirect and the one who removed the plug is not liable (Tosafos, B.K. 4b, d.h. V’eima).

Others distinguish between murder and damages. Regarding murder, there is a technical exemption from the death penalty if the victim did not die from the initial rush of water. Even though it was likely that the victim would die, the subsequent flow of water was not the direct act of the murderer. Regarding damages, since the resulting damage was inevitable, the mazik (damager) is liable, even though it was somewhat indirect (garmi — indirect damage that is inevitable and thus one is liable) — (Chiddushei HaRan, Sanhedrin 77b; Imrei Binah, Shabbos 27).

This debate, however, is limited to cases like the dam where the water that will damage is already present and will certainly pour through upon removal of the plug. Liability for damage caused by wind depends on what occurred. If the wind was blowing as one opened the window and immediately knocked over an object, it is similar to the case of the plug on the dam, and he is liable. If the wind was not blowing when one opened the window, and the damage occurred later when the wind started to blow, the damage is indirect and the one who opened the window is not liable (Mishpat Hamazik 12:39).

In this circumstance, the damage is not even categorized as garmi, since one of the conditions for damage to be categorized as garmi is that the damage occurs immediately and it must result from the object the mazik touched (see Gra 155:131; Ulam Hamishpat; cf. Shach 155:22). In this case, since the wind did not blow immediately and it was not opening the window that caused the damage, the mazik is not liable.

Regarding your question, if the wind was blowing when you opened the window and the speakers were immediately knocked to the ground, you are liable for the damage, since it is considered as though you broke them. If the wind did not knock them over until some later time, the damage is indirect and you are not liable. If, however, you were negligent and should have realized that when the wind began to blow the speakers would fall, you have a moral obligation (latzeis yedei Shamayim) to pay the owner.

Q: I rented a summer home for the weekend without drafting a written contract. What are the terms of such a rental?

A: A confirmed rental is binding according to the terms stipulated, whether written or verbal. Terms that were not addressed are in accordance with the local common practice (minhag hamedinah) — (C.M. 315:2, 331:1; Sma 315:3).

However, for the rental agreement to be binding, the price must be either stipulated, known, left to the discretion of a third party, or agreed as the average going rate (C.M. 200:7, 331:3; Radbaz 6:2282).

If the renter used the rental item without an agreed price, he pays the going rate. If there is a price range, he pays only the lower end of the range and is not obligated to pay the average rate. However, the owner can refuse to allow him further use at this price, since the rental agreement is not binding without a defined price (as above) — (Maharashdam, C.M. #245; Ketzos 331:3; Pischei Choshen, Sechirus 5:[4], 8:4).