Mr. Gross owned a large supply company. A dispute arose over a shipment of goods to one of his long-time clients, Mr. Kleiner, who ran a small store. Mr. Gross made numerous offers to settle the dispute, but Mr. Kleiner adamantly refused to pay anything, insisting that he bore no liability.

Mr. Gross had no choice but to sue Mr. Kleiner. The parties agreed to adjudicate before Rabbi Dayan’s beis din and presented their case.

On technical grounds, the halachah was in favor of Mr. Gross, although “common sense” justice was not necessarily so. In addition, Mr. Kleiner’s difficult financial situation made it hard to lay the law against him. The debated sum was significant for him, but a drop in the bucket for Mr. Gross.

After the Dayanim convened, Rabbi Dayan called the litigants in. “By law, Mr. Gross is entitled to collect the full amount of his claim,” he said. “However, on account of Mr. Kleiner’s financial circumstances, we recommend that he be benevolent and compromise on half the amount.”

“Is financial status a reason to issue a ruling in his favor?” asked Mr. Gross. “The Torah states explicitly, ‘Do not favor the poor’ (Vayikra 19:15). How can you do this? Furthermore, if I am entitled to the full amount, why should I forgo half?”

“As evident throughout the proceedings, Mr. Kleiner is in a delicate financial situation,” said Rabbi Dayan. “Demanding full payment is liable to drive him out of business. That is not in your best interest, either, as you lose a long-time customer.”

Mr. Gross’s advocate spoke up. “My client appreciates your concern, but this does not seem the role of the beis din,” he said. “We offered Mr. Kleiner ample opportunities for mediation and out-of-court settlements. If your verdict is that he is liable, how can you encourage us now to compromise?”

“You are correct that once the verdict has been issued, the Dayanim cannot impose a compromise, even if the litigants initially also authorized compromise,” answered Rabbi Dayan. “That would be cheating the rightful party and an injustice. Some authorities write that doing so would be considered a ta’us bidvar mishnah (mistrial) and the compromise is null and void. However, another person who is not a Dayan can try to mediate even after the ruling has been issued; this should be done outside of beis din” (C.M. and Rav Akiva Eiger 12:2).

“Nonetheless, the Shach (12:6) and Aruch Hashulchan (12:2) write that if the Dayanim do not press the compromise upon the litigants, but rather explain the benefit of the compromise and persuade the litigants until they agree, they are allowed to do so,” continued Rabbi Dayan. “Others maintain, though, that the Dayanim should not do so; this is the more prevalent practice” (Pischei Teshuvah 12:5).

“Nonetheless, some write that if the Dayanim clearly state the ruling but nonetheless advise the rightful party to concede lifnim mishuras hadin (beyond the letter of the law), it is certainly permitted,” added Rabbi Dayan. “A story is told that the Chazon Ish ruled in a certain case, but afterward said, ‘You are right, but exempt him’” (Mishpetei Tzedek, p. 64).

“What if the Dayanim haven’t issued the ruling, but already came to a halachic conclusion?” asked Mr. Kleiner.

“Tosafos and many other authorities maintain that once the Dayan knows what the ruling is, he should no longer advocate compromise,” answered Rabbi Dayan. “However, the Shulchan Aruch rules that until the verdict is issued, the Dayan can still advocate compromise. The Shach (12:4) supports this position, since it is a mitzvah to achieve a peaceful resolution, whereas Bach and Birkei Yosef write that one should follow Tosafos’s opinion.

“Rav Nissim Karelitz, shlita, is cited as ruling that until a decisive verdict is issued, compromise is still possible, since in most cases where a compromise is recommended the case is not clear-cut and there remains room for doubt” (Pischei Teshuvah 12:4; Mishpetei Tzedek, Tziyun Hamishpat 12:65).

Last week’s column stated that custom dictates that partnership decisions are determined by a majority. This reminded me of a situation when my partners made a decision without consulting with me. I am certain that given the opportunity I would have convinced them to follow my position.

Q: Is that decision binding since I wasn’t consulted about it?

A: When ten people are appointed judges and the agreement states that if they do not reach a unanimous decision the matter will be decided by a simple majority, it is imperative that all ten panel members vote. If a member is not present for the final vote or refuses to vote because he does not know what to rule, the decision of the remaining nine is void, even though they unanimously agree. The reason is that the non-voting judge could assert that, had he reached a decision, he might have been able to convince the other judges of his opinion (C.M. 13:7). Even though had he voted, he would have been outvoted, nevertheless, by declaring that he does not know, it is treated as though he was not part of the deliberations, and the agreement was that the matter would be decided by a panel of ten judges.

Some argue that it is only regarding beis din and communal decisions (where they are striving to ascertain the truth) that it is imperative to include everyone in the debate before voting. Business decisions do not involve an attempt to ascertain the truth, and it is understood that personal biases will play a factor in each partner’s vote; therefore, as long as a majority votes a certain way, that decision is binding, even if some of the partners were absent when the matter was debated and voted upon (Mishpetei HaTorah 2:67).

However, we do find Poskim who maintain that when partners agree to make decisions according to a majority vote, all the partners must be present for the discussion (Maharit 1:95, cited by Erech Shai 176:10; Pischei Teshuvah 231:6).

Generally, the discussion before the vote must be done orally and it is questioned whether written communication suffices (Kuntres Hasemichah [Maharlbach], Seder Hadin 8:2). Obviously, if the partnership agreement states that written communication suffices, that would be acceptable (Maharashdam, Y.D. 78; Teshuras Shai 2:56).

Concerning a panel of judges, if the non-voting judge returns and agrees with the decision of the others, that decision is binding (Maharashdam, ibid., cited by Pischei Teshuvah 13:7). If, upon the return of the non-voting judge, they deliberate together and nevertheless remain with their original decision, there are authorities who contend that the matter is not decided by the majority. The concern is that the judges will be hesitant to change their vote since it constitutes an admission that the initial vote was incorrect (Maharlbach, Kuntres Hasemichah, p. 2b).

Precedent for this concern is found in a case when a judge spoke with only one of the litigants and, in violation of Halachah, wrote a ruling. That judge may no longer serve on a panel of three judges to adjudicate the dispute, out of concern that his mind is made up and he will not be receptive to changing his original position (Shach, C.M. 17:9).

These concerns, however, apply to issuing halachic rulings where it is potentially humiliating for a judge to have to admit that he ruled incorrectly. Regarding a partnership, if the partners convene a second time with all the members present, we are not concerned that members who voted already will be reluctant to change their position for their benefit, since it is not as humiliating to simply change one’s opinion (see Maharit, ibid.).

Q: I’m tight on funds. How critical is timely payment of rent?

A:  There is a mitzvah to pay wages promptly and a prohibition against withholding or delaying timely payment of wages. The Sifra extends this prohibition to rental fees of other items. There is an opinion that the prohibition does not apply to property rental, but many authorities maintain that it applies also to real estate, especially a building that is merely attached to the ground (C.M., Gra and Ketzos 339:1; Ahavas Chessed 9:5).Therefore, a renter must be careful to pay his rent promptly. The same is true of one who rents or leases a car or other equipment.

However, the halachic obligation to pay wages and rent is only at the conclusion of each payment period (e.g., month). Thus, since nowadays real estate rent is usually due at the beginning of the period, the prohibition against delaying (bal talin) does not apply (Mishpatecha L’Yaakov 6:35:3a; Gam Ani Odcha #169). Nonetheless, one is obligated to honor any monetary commitment promptly if he is able to (C.M. 339:7-8).