It was Yom Kippur Eve. The shul began filling rapidly as the time approached for Kol Nidrei. Hershel Machlis sat in his seat, cloaked in his tallis (prayer shawl) and kittel, quietly reciting Tefillah Zakkah, a prayer composed by the Chayei Adam 150 years ago.

This emotional prayer ushers in the Holy Day with an admission of our spiritual inadequacies and a supplication that the afflictions and prayers of the day should atone for our sins. It also includes a declaration of forgiveness and forgoing bygones to those who have wronged us, and a request that others may forgive us, as well.

“I forgive completely anyone who sinned against me, whether physically, monetarily, or verbally … except for money that I [intend to and] can collect in beis din … Everyone else I forgive completely… so that no one should be punished on my account. Just as I forgive every person, so too, grant me favor in the eyes of other people that they should forgive me fully.”

Mr. Machlis paused to think about Mr. Schor. Earlier in the year, Mr. Schor had borrowed money from him to marry off a child. As the months wore on, it became clear that the money would not be returned quickly. Mr. Machlis had decided in his mind to forgo the loan as an additional “wedding gift,” but had never said anything to Mr. Schor.

Recently, though, the two had gotten into a dispute. Mr. Machlis changed his mind and decided that he no longer was willing to forgo the debt. He didn’t want Mr. Schor to be punished on Yom Kippur, but he did want the money back.

“What about a loan that I previously intended to forgo?” wondered Mr. Machlis. “Can I still collect that?”

He decided to speak with Rabbi Dayan after davening.

“Tefillah Zakkah made me think about a loan that I had decided to forego, but changed my mind,” Mr. Machlis said. “Am I still allowed to demand repayment?”

“The primary intent of Tefillah Zakkah is to exempt the debtor from Heavenly punishment,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “Although it uses the term ‘mechilah gemurah’ (forgoing completely), it likely does not express intent to forgo legal rights. Nonetheless, the issue you raised is a fascinating one, known in halachah as ‘mechilah balev’, forgoing in one’s mind.’”

“Oh really?” exclaimed Mr. Machlis. “Who addresses this issue?”

“The Ketzos Hachoshen (12:1) cites a statement of the Maharshal that a person who decided to forgo his loan and now wants to take revenge and collect it, may no longer do so,” replied Rabbi Dayan, “since mechilah in the mind is considered mechilah.”

“The proof is from a gemara (Kesubos 104a) that a widow who did not claim her kesubah for 25 years can no longer do so,” explained Rabbi Dayan. “One explanation is that in the context of kesubah, her extended silence indicates intention to forgo the kesubah. Although she never said anything, her intention to forgo is valid.”

“Does the Ketzos accept this view?” asked Mr. Machlis.

“The Ketzos is troubled by the principle of ‘devarim shebalev einam devarim,’” said Rabbi Dayan. “Thoughts alone are not of legal consequence, with the exception of sacred donations.

“The Ketzos, citing the Maharit, differentiates that when the intention is clearly evident to all, as in the case of the widow, we attribute significance to thoughts. However, when the intention is not clearly evident, as in the average case of mechilah balev, it is not of significance.”

“What is the accepted ruling?” asked Mr. Machlis.

“Most authorities agree with the Ketzos,” said Rabbi Dayan. “There are some, though, who concur with the Maharshal.” (See Nesivos 12:5; Aruch Hashulchan 12:8; Yabia Omer C.M. 3:3.)

“So what do I do?” asked Mr. Machlis.

“You are certainly entitled to demand your money, in accordance with the majority opinion,” said Rabbi Dayan. “If it were to become known to the beis din, though, that you initially decided in your mind to forgo the loan, they would likely not enforce payment, in deference to the minority opinion and the principle of hamotzi mei’chaveiro alav hare’aya.”