It was summertime. Congregation Shaar Shamayim was relatively empty, as many of its members were away in camps or in bungalows.
The gabbai, Mr. Gelb, was having a hard time finding someone to lein (read the Torah) that week. Finally, he decided to employ one of the few yeshiva boys who were around.
“We need someone to lein at Shaar Shamayim,” Mr. Gelb said to Eliezer. “Any chance you’re available?”
“I am,” replied Eliezer. “Do you pay for the leining?”
“We usually have a rotation of members without pay,” answered Mr. Gelb. “When we need outside people, though, we pay $200 for the leining.”
“Great,” said Eliezer. “See you on Shabbos.”
Later that day, Eliezer received a phone call from the gabbai of another shul, which also needed someone to lein.
“Sorry, but I just committed to lein elsewhere,” said Eliezer.
The following day, one of the regular leiners called Mr. Gelb.
“We changed our plans and will be here for Shabbos,” he said. “So, if you want, I can lein on Shabbos.”
“Thank you,” said Mr. Gelb. “Meanwhile, I hired Eliezer to lein, though. I’ll see if I can cancel him.”
Mr. Gelb called back Eliezer. “It turns out that one of our members can lein this week,” he said. “Is that okay with you?”
“Actually, it’s a problem,” said Eliezer. “Shortly after you called, I had another job offer, which I had to turn down.”
“Do you think they may still need you?” asked Mr. Gelb.
“No, they already arranged with one of my friends,” replied Eliezer. “I’m not out to cause the shul an unnecessary expense, but I’m also facing a loss. I’d like to ask Rabbi Dayan.”
“That’s fine with me,” said Mr. Gelb. “Whatever he says.”
Eliezer called Rabbi Dayan and explained the situation. “Would the shul have to pay me for the leining, even if one of the members is now available to lein?”
“It would be most ethical for the shul to uphold its verbal commitment to you,” answered Rabbi Dayan (see Rema 204:11). “However, even if the shul insisted on having its member lein, they would still have a legal liability to pay you for the leining, since they caused you to lose an alternate job. Assuming you enjoy leining, they would have to pay you fully, not only partially as po’el batel, since you would prefer the time and effort of learning the Torah reading to being idle (C.M. 333:2; Rema 334:4, 335:1).”
“I’m surprised that the shul would have a legal liability, not just a moral obligation,” said Eliezer. “Isn’t this a form of indirect loss, grama? We learned in yeshiva that mevatel kiso shel chaveiro — canceling a friend’s financial gain — is considered only grama, which does not have an enforceable obligation.”
“Excellent! In fact, the Ketzos (333:2-3) cites the Maharam that one does not have a full legal liability for this reason,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “However, his opinion is not accepted (see Pischei Choshen, Sechirus 10[10]).”
“Why not?” asked Eliezer.
“There are a few explanations,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “Tosafos and the Rosh view this as garmi, a direct cause, for which there is legal liability (Sma 332:8).
“Others explain the liability as one of davar ha’avud in employer-employee relationships,” added Rabbi Dayan. “An employee cannot quit a job if it will cause significant loss to the employer; if he does, the employer can employ others at his expense. In parallel, if the employer retracts in a situation that causes the employee a loss, he is liable and must compensate the employee for the lost wages (see Rabi Akiva Eiger 333:2).”
“Are there other explanations?” asked Eliezer.
“The Ketzos suggests that the responsibility is on account of the liability of sheves (missed employment) when damaging another,” said Rabbi Dayan. “Nesivos (333:3) suggests that this liability is an institution of Chazal.”
“What if I found another shul to lein in that offers lower pay?” asked Eliezer.
“Shaar Shamayim would then be liable to pay the difference between the jobs,” answered Rabbi Dayan.