The colorful advertisement attracted Mr. Freilich’s attention. “Mishloach Manos Express!” it proclaimed. “This year, Purim is on Sunday. Most services won’t deliver. We will prepare and deliver your mishloach manos nationwide, on Purim!”

Mr. Freilich’s son Mordechai had moved to Chicago five years ago. Each year Mr. Freilich sent mishloach manos through FedEx 24-hour delivery, to ensure that it would arrive on Purim day, but was wondering what to do this year. He contacted the number listed in the ad, and ordered mishloach manos for Mordechai.

Over the weekend, though, a tremendous snowstorm hit Chicago, bringing the city to a standstill. Needless to say, the mishloach manos could not be delivered on Purim.

The day after Purim Mordechai Freilich received the package with a note: “This package was meant to be delivered on Purim but was delayed due to the storm. Please accept our apologies.”

When Mr. Freilich heard that the delivery was a day late, he called Mishloach Manos Express (MME) to complain. “You promised delivery on Purim,” Mr. Feilich said. “That was the whole point. I’d like a refund.”

“We understand your disappointment,” MME replied. “However, you clearly understand that the delay was due to circumstances beyond our control.”

“I’m not blaming you,” said Mr. Freilich, “but you didn’t fulfill the terms of our agreement. You promised delivery on Purim and it didn’t happen!”

“We also did not expect this,” said MME. “We cannot take responsibility for acts of G-d.”

“I would like to ask Rabbi Dayan about this,” said Mr. Freilich. “Is that acceptable?”

“We’re willing to accept Rabbi Dayan’s ruling,” said MME. “You can ask him and we will abide by his ruling.”

Mr. Freilich contacted Rabbi Dayan. “I arranged for mishloach manos to be delivered on Purim through Mishloach Manos Express,” he said. “Due to the storm, they were not able to deliver on Purim. Must they refund my money?”

“The Taz (Y.D. 236:13) writes that if someone ordered timely merchandise, with an agreement that delivery must be by a certain time, and the delivery was delayed — even on account of uncontrollable circumstances — the customer can refuse the order and cancel the agreement,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “However, if the time element was not an essential aspect of the order, the customer cannot revoke the sale when the delivery was delayed because of uncontrollable circumstances.”

“Why is the seller penalized if he could not deliver due to uncontrollable circumstance?” asked Mr. Freilich.

“Oness, an uncontrollable circumstance, exempts a person from punishment or fines, or from an obligation that affects only him,” explained Rabbi Dayan. “However, when there is a mutual agreement, which affects two parties, the second party can claim that he also committed only on the basis of the agreed terms. He should not lose if the terms were not upheld — for any reason! Uncontrollable circumstances can exempt the first person, but cannot obligate the second party. Thus, MME must refund the money” (Mishpat Shalom, C.M. 200:7).

“What if the time element was not stipulated, but clearly understood?” asked Mr. Freilich.

“Presumably, the same would be true,” answered Rabbi Dayan. “If the delay makes the merchandise unusable, it’s tantamount to damaged merchandise” (See Darchei Misphat 13:14).

“What if the time element wasn’t critical, but mentioned as a stipulation for the order?” asked Mr. Freilich.

“The Taz might not allow cancelling such an order,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “However, the Shach (Nekudos Hakesef, Y.D. 263:3-7; C.M. 21:3) writes that if the delivery arrangement was mentioned as a stipulation, the customer can refuse the shipment if it was not upheld, even due to uncontrollable circumstances. Only if the terms of delivery were not presented as a stipulation for the sale, or if the order was initially placed without stipulation, and the terms of delivery were added later, is a claim of oness valid. His position is accepted by later authorities” (see Nesivos, C.M. 21:3; Pischei Teshuvah 207:2).