I was hired as a rebbi in a summer camp. My salary included meals served by the camp kitchen. The kitchen unexpectedly became unusable and the camp was forced to begin to purchase meals from a caterer. We were notified that staff meals would not be supplied by the caterer, and we will have to care for ourselves from now on.

Q: Does the camp have the right to force this change upon us?

A: The core issue of this question is whether an obligation to provide for another person remains in force if the value of this obligation increases in value in an unforeseen fashion.

A similar situation is discussed in Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 114:1) regarding a case where one obligated himself to support the daughters of his wife from a previous marriage for a predetermined period of time. Eventually, the cost of living increased in an unanticipated dramatic manner.

According to some opinions, since it is clear that the benefactor never intended to obligate himself to this amount, he is not obligated to pay the increase beyond reason (Taz ibid, 2). According to other opinions, the right of the recipients to the support he committed to entitles them to demand it, regardless of its increase in value. They define the obligation similar to an object that a customer purchased but has yet to receive. Since the customer already owns the object, the seller must deliver it to him even if the value of this object increases sharply from the time of the sale to the time of shipping. Similarly, the obligation is owned by the recipient and its monetary value increased for the recipient (Sha’ar Mishpat C.M. 60:4).

Since the matter does not have a definitive conclusion, Bais Din could not force the person who made the pledge to carry out his commitment in such a circumstance (see Imrei Binah Halva’ah 49).

Accordingly, in your case, the camp agreed to provide meals for the staff, assuming that the meals would be prepared in their own kitchen. They did not anticipate the sharp price increase of catered meals. As such, the obligation of the camp to provide meals cannot be forced on them.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the camp’s commitment was only to allow the staff to take meals from the food that was prepared in their kitchen, not to actually provide meals for the staff. Accordingly, once meals are no longer being produced in their kitchen, they do not retain an ongoing obligation to provide meals from another source (see C.M. 310:2, 312:17).

This analysis, however, only addresses the obligation of the camp. Since the meals were part of the overall compensation package for the staff and the camp no longer provides those meals, the staff arguably has the right to quit or at least to renegotiate their salaries (see Nachlas Zvi 312:10).